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I. Introduction

areas farmland is now a natural resource and a
rare commodity. In these areas, such as Suffolk
County, New York, and Montgomery County, Maryland, the most direct, effective and stringent farmland preservation measures in use are being imposed.

What recourse is there for a farmer who owns a
farm , and finds that farm threatened by increased
residential and commercial developments? Such a
farmer, while receiving more and more complaints
about normal and necessary farm operations, may
also be tempted to sell the land by offers to purchase
pieces of the farm here and there. These problems
are the focus of farmland preservation measuresmeasures designed to preserve farmland in use as
farmland .
The primary purpose of farmland preservation
techniques is maintenance of agricultural land as
a food source.l The question necessarily arises
whether there is even a need for as much farmland
as presently exists. There are surpluses of most
crops and the government is still paying farmers
not to plant their land . Although there may be no
immediate crisis of reduced acreage, agriculture
has pushed farmland to its limits. Technology has
been pushed to its limit in terms of yields per acre.
The soil has been pushed to its limit in terms of
what it can sustain. Although we may not have
experienced yet any repercussions from the declining number of acres in use as farmland, in the near
future we may experience such repercussions as
demand for agricultural products begins to exceed
supply.
The primary threat to farmland is development. 2
Although the metropolitan areas in this country
encompass only 17% of our total land mass, they
encompass 20% of our prime farmland. 3 As a result,
there is an additional reason for farmland preservation in rapidly developing areas: preservation of
open space and scenic beauty.4 In highly developed

II. Farmland Preservation Techniques
Farmland preservation techniques are either direct or indirect. The most commonly utilized, the
most widely accepted, and the least effective are
indirect measures, which are primarily tax reforms.
Such measures simply attempt to put cash back
into the pockets of the farmer in order to encourage
the farmer to continue farming. One such tax measure is differential assessment of agricultural land
for property taxes, by which agricultural land is
assessed at its agricultural use value rather than
at its usually higher current market value.1i A similar tax reform is farm use valuation for inheritance
taxes. The idea behind farm use valuation for inheritance taxes is keeping the farm in the family
upon a death in the family, that is, not to have the
family lose the farm as a result of high inheritance
taxes. Again, the farm is valued at its farm use
value rather than at its higher current market
value. 6 A somewhat more effective indirect method
is the utilization of income tax credits, as in Michigan and Wisconsin. In these states the farmer may
use some or all of his or her local property taxes as
dollar for dollar credits against state income taxes.7
The more direct measures for farmland preservation vary widely in their effectiveness and in
their implementation. The most widespread is agricultural zoning, that is, zoning that restricts uses
73

pected, a tax measure: differential assessment 01
agricultural land for property taxes. Section 84-483
of the Arkansas Statutes provided for differential
assessment of agricultural land for state property
taxes. 15 For a brief period this provision was
deemed unconstitutional; in Arkansas Public Service Commission v. Pulaski County Board of Equalization,I6 the Arkansas Supreme Court struck
down differential assessment for agricultural land
as being in violation of the state constitution's uniformity clause. The uniformity clause provides that
all land within the state has to be assessed at the
same valueP In November of 1980, however,
through Amendment No. 59 to the Arkansas Constitution, the old section 5 of Article 16 was repealed and new sections 5 and 15(b) were added to
Article 16. These now provide that agricultural
land can be valued for taxation purposes upon the
basis of its agricultural productivity or use. 18

in the zone to agriculture and related uses, either
exclusively or nonexclusively.8 A second method is
agricultural districting: the non-binding designation for long term agricultural use of an area within
the state on a voluntary basis. Farms that participate on a voluntary basis within the district become eligible for certain designated governmental
benefits and programs. 9 Somewhat similar is com- .
prehensive planning, which is usually statewide
planning combining land use and other programs
designed to encourage an area to remain in long
term agricultural uses. 10 Development pennit systems require a special permit over and beyond the
usual building and zoning permits for construction
on agricultural land, so that more serious consideration will be given to an increase in development
in an agricultural area. 11
The fmal three direct methods are the most complex, the most interesting, and possibly the most
effective. The first is right-to-farm legislation, or
the so-called right-to-farm acts. These acts insulate
farmers from nuisance suits under circumstances
that vary from statute to statute. 12 The other two
programs are purchase of development rights and
transfer of development rights. 13 These last two
programs are best explained by way of an illustration.
Assume that an area is zoned so that ten housing
units can be built per acre. Within this zone is a
fann which has only one house built on it, and the
zoning board decides that it would like to maintain
the entire area at that level of development. The
zoning board then zones the area so that it can have
only one housing unit per acre. It may be that an
area landowner would bring a taking challenge to
the zoning restriction. To forestall that possibility,
the zoning board could sever the development
rights from the property and make them available
either for immediate sale to the local planning
agency or a "land bank," in which case it is a purchase of development rights program, or to other
landowners in a designated receiving area, in which
case it is a transfer of development rights program.
In essence, then, the right to develop the property
is severed from the property so that it cannot be
used on that property, but it is severed so that it
can be sold either to a local planning agency or land
bank, or to other landowners in a designated receiving parcel. 14

B. The Right-to.Farm Act
The one direct method of farmland preservation
in Arkansas is the Right-to-Farrn Act. In 1981, the
Arkansas legislature passed right-to-farrn legislation to protect Arkansas farms from nuisance suits
often brought by owners of nearby residences or
other private development. Section 34-122 provides:
An agricultural facility or its appurtenances or
the operation thereof shall not be or become a
nuisance, private or public, as a result of any
changed conditions in and about the locality
thereof after the same has been in operation for
a period of one (1] year or more, when such facility, its appurtenances or the operation thereof
was not a nuisance at the time the operation
thereof began. 19
Therefore, an agricultural facility cannot be a nuisance as a result of changed conditions in its locality
after it has been in operation for one year. The
principle is to strengthen the familiar "coming to
the nuisance" defense that the common law ofnuisance has always treated somewhat diffidently.
Courts applying the common law treat "coming to
the nuisance" as a factor to be resisted, but not as
an absolute defense. 2o If a person moves next door
to a poultry operation, at common law that person
may still complain about the normal operations of
the poultry operation after having moved into that
area. The act changes this, by making "coming to
the nuisance" a defense with real teeth.
"Agricultural facility" is defined under § 34-121
to include, but not be limited to, "any plant, facility,
structure or establishment used for the feeding,
growing, production, holding, processing, storage or

III. Farmland Preservation in Arkansas
A. Tax Measures
The Arkansas statutes provide for both an indirect method and a direct method of farmland preservation. The indirect method is, as might be ex74

distribution, for commercial purposes, of crops, livestock, poultry, swine or fish or products derived
from any of them. "21 The act also provides under
§ 34-123 that the provisions of the act do not have
any effect on legal actions to reoover damages from
injuries sustained from "any pollution of, or change
in the condition of, the waters of any stream or on
account of any overflow of the lands of any person,
firm or corporation."22 Not only does the act protect
the farmer from nuisance suits, but under § 34-124
it also renders void any municipal or county ordinance making the operation of an agricultural fa- .
cility a nuisance under the circumstances prohib~
ited in the act.2S Finally, under § 34-126, an
agricultural facility will lose the protection of the
act if the facility "materially changes its character
of operation or materially increases the size of its
physical plant. "24 For example, if an individual
moves next door to a vegetable farm, and it subsequently becomes a feedlot, the operation would
not be protected under the act from the neighbor's
nuisance suit.
There are no reported cases in Arkansas under
the Right-to-Farm Act. There are two possible explanations. First, it may be that the lack of case
law is attributable to the conflict between farmland
and development not having reached a point at
which there is a need for the act. The alternative
explanation is that there is a lack of awareness of
the protections ofthe act both on the part offarmers
and their lawyers.
There are many unanswered questions under the ·
Arkansas Right-to-Farm Act due to the lack of judicial interpretation and the very broad statutory
language. For example, is the definition of an "agricultural facility" as broad as it seems? It includes
a facility processing products "derived from" crops,
livestock, poultry, swine or fish. Would a fertilizer
processing plant be included? It is difficult to imagine any facility that has any connection. with agricultural products that would not be\ included
within the definition.
A facility is protected from nuisance suits as a
result of "changed conditions" in the locality. What
constitutes "changed conditions"? How extensive
must the encroaching development be? If an area
that was used only for farming is still primarily a
farming area but is experiencing increased residential development, and complaints are being
brought against a farm in that area, can the farmer
defend on the ground that there are changed conditions in the locality?
If the facility has to be in operation for more than
one year before any "changed conditions," what is
necessary for it to be "in operation?" How consistent
must the operation be during that period of time?

Is a barn on a lot sufficient to have the facility
qualify as being "in operation?"
A facility will not be protected under the act if it
was a nuisance at the time it began. Who proves
that the facility was or was not a nuisance at the
time it began? What kind of evidence is necessary?
Would evidence of complaints by landowners be sufficient, or would the evidence have to be more formal-for example, complaints flIed with local agencies or lawsuits flIed?
A facility loses its protection under the act if there
is a "material change" in the character or size of
the operation. What is such a "material change''?
Is a material change for the better from a nuisance
law perspective nevertheless enough to make the
facility lose its protection under the act? rntimately, will this provision discourage innovative
farming techniques or improvements in farming
techniques by farmers?
As mentioned earlier, the act does not prohibit
suits based on water (not air) pollution, changes in
the condition of water, or any overflow of the land.
How would these provisions interrelate with any
applicable state permits or federal permits for discharges into streams and the farmer's compliance
with those permits? If a farmer is complying with
all state and federal permits, and a nuisance lawsuit is brought, is the nuisance lawsuit then not
based on water pollution?
How may the farmer utilize the provision making
local ordinances void under the circumstances prohibited in the act? Can this provision only be used
as an affIrmative defense to a prosecution under
the ordinances? Or can the farmer somehow utilize
the provision to prevent passage of such ordinances
in the fIrst place?
The biggest potential "loophole" in the act should
also be noted. Although the act restricts actions
based on nuisance, it may not restrict suits predicated on negligence or trespass, which can sometimes bring esentially the same type of complaint
before a court. The extent to which this potential
loophole exists for causes of action predicated on
negligence is problematic, however, due to disagreement over what types of conducf are encompassed in the term "nuisance." According to the
Second Restatement of Torts and the fourth edition
of PROSSER ON TORTS, nuisance is a field of tort
liability with reference to interference with land
uses, rather than a separate and distinct type of
tortious conduct. According to this approach, liability for "nuisance" may rest upon an intentional
invasion of the plaintiffs interests, negligence, or
strict liability.25 In contrast the most recent edition
of PROSSER rejects the approach of the Second Restatement and the late William Prosser and char75 .

pose of the TDR's is defeated if the farmer is stuck
with TDR's that he cannot sell. The farmer will
have no economic return for the restrictions based
on his property, he may bring a taking challenge,
and the local planning agency will be threatened
with a lawsuit.
An alternative to TDR's is to have the local planning agency or a "land bank" agree to purchase the
development rights from the landowner to hold in
abeyance or to sell to individual landowners or developers in a designated receiving parcel. In this
situation the program is a purchase of development
rights ("POR") program rather than a true TOR
program. A PDR program would shift the economic
risk from the farmer to the local planning agency
or land bank, but in that case the local planning
agency or land bank must have sufficient money to
engage in widespread purchase of the development
rights.29
The primary legal issue that arises in connection
with zoning schemes utilizing TDR's is the question
of whether there is a taking without just compensation. Overly restrictive government regulation
may constitute deprivation of private property
without just compensation under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. so TOR's are essentially designed to forestall such a taking challenge by providing the landowner with sufficient economic return on the
development rights to undermine the constitutional claim. Under the traditional taking test a
taking occurs when the landowner is deprived of
all or almost all of the economic value of his property as a whole. S !
The principal Supreme Court opinion in this area
is Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of
New York. 32 In Penn Central, there was a taking
challenge to New York City's landmarks preservation law designating Grand Central Station as a
landmark and granting TOR's in return for restrictions on the right to develop. The Supreme Court
in an opinion by Justice Brennan upheld New York
City's landmarks preservation law, concluding that
there was no taking because there were sufficient
economic uses remaining in the property as a whole
so that a taking had not been established. In determining whether there had been a taking, the
court suggested that the value of TOR's granted to
the landmark owner was a factor to be considered
in whether there was a taking. 33
Justice Rehnquist in his dissent took a very different approach. He focused only on the particular
property right that had been taken, the right to
develop the air space above Grand Central Station,
and concluded that there was indeed a taking of
the property right and, therefore, a taking in the

acterizes nuisance as encompassing only intentional interference of a substantial and unreasonable nature in another's use and enjoyment of
land.26
This scholarly disagreement is of significant
practical importance to what causes of action are
precluded under the Arkansas Right-to-Farm Act.
Under the act, a qualifying agricultural facility may
not be held liable on a "nuisance" theory. By using
the term "nuisance," did the legislature intend to
insulate agricultural facilities from tort liability
predicated on intentional interference, strict liability and negligence, or simply from liability for
intentional interference constituting an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs land? This determination is complicated by the fact that the Arkansas statute did not retain the provision in the
North Carolina statute on which it is modeled
which expressly retains an agricultural facility's
liability for negligence. Did the Arkansas legislature omit that provision because it intended to insulate agricultural facilities from negligence liability, or did it omit the provision on the assumption
that insulation from "nuisance" liability did not encompass liability for negligence, thus obviating the
need for an express provision so providing?

IV. An Innovative Technique for Farmland
Pre8ervation-Transferable Development
Right8
One of the more innovative techniques for farmland preservation is the transfer of development
rights (''TOR's''). As discussed earlier, TOR's sever
the development rights from a piece of property so
that they can be sold to developers or landowners
in a designated receiving parcel with a higher density of zoning.
There are many practical problems with TOR
programs. From the perspective of the farmer, the
farmer may wish to develop his farmland due to
approaching retirement, desire for profit, or any
number of reasons. Because the development rights
have been severed from his property, he may sell
those development rights but he may not utilize
those development rights on his own property. The
primary practical problem with TDR's is creation
of a market for sale of the TDR's. It is very difficult
to assess what the market value of TOR's should
be so that the landowner receives sufficient economic return on those development rights. Added
to this difficulty is the difficulty in selecting a receiving parcel with a high enough potential for density to create a demand for sale of TOR's that will
reflect that market value in the purchase and sale
between the farmer and the landowner.28 The pur76

constitutional sense. He also concluded that TDR's
were relevant only to the issue of whether "just
compensation" had been given once a taking had
been found. 34
These are two very different approaches, with
significant repercussions for the future of taking
law. On the taking issue generally, since Penn Central there has been a series of Supreme Court cases
suggesting that the members of the court are moving away from Justice Brennan's traditional approach on the taking issue and toward Justice
Rehnquist's approach, which focuses on the extent
of governmental interference with a particular
property right (e.g., the right to develop) rather
than on the economic effects on the property as a
whole. In these later cases, Kaiser Aetna v. United
States ,56 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corporation,sa and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company,S7 there is a strong suggestion that the court
is beginning to focus more on the particular property right that is taken rather than on the economic
effects of the property as a whole. As a result, remaining economic uses of the property after interference with a particular property right have become less significant than they were under the
traditional taking test. The end result is that there
is a greater likelihood of successful taking challenges. If a particular property right is taken in its
entirety, and that economic right is determined to
be economically significant, there may be a taking
although there may still remain economically viable uses of the property.
The Supreme Court has recently avoided several
cases in which restrictive zoning coupled with a
grant of TDR's have been challenged as a taking. 8S
Such scenarios appear likely to recur until the court
is squarely confronted with the issue. The ramifications for taking law upon adoption of Rehnquist's
approach would be that it would be easier to bring
a taking challenge and concomittantly more difficult for planning agencies to engage in innovative
land use techniques.
There are several criticisms to which Justice
Rehnquist's approach may be subjected. From an
economic perspective, it makes little sense to evaluate a purported taking from the perspective of its
economic effect on a single property right rather
than from the perspective of the economic effects
of the regulation on the property as a whole. As
Justice Rehnquist points out, however, the traditional taking approach raises the dilemma of defining the unit of property upon which the economic
effects are to be evaluated. However, this problem
can be adequately dealt with by the Court by simply
deferring to the factual fmdings and economic determinations of the local planning agency. There is

authority for such an approach under the present
formulation of the so-called Ben Avon doctrine of
judicial review.59 Also, from a legal perspective, relegating the value ofTDR's to the issue of just compensation would render TDR's irrelevant to a taking challenge under the takings clause although
ostensibly they would still be a relevant to a related
due process challenge. For these reasons and from
a public policy perspective of preserving our natural
resources, Justice Brennan's approach in Penn Central should prevail over that of Justice Rebnquist.
Land use innovation has made many traditional
legal concepts of takings obsolete. What is needed
in taking law is more flexibility, not less flexibility,
and Justice Rehnquist's approach promises a more
formalistic, rigid approach.
TDR's, whatever their future might be, are only
one of several recent innovative techniques in farmland preservation. Greater awareness of all available preservation techniques, both in Arkansas and
in other jurisdictions, should be encouraged from
the threat of expanding residential development if
agriculture is to be protected as an industry within
Arkansas.
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